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Ongoing shifts in patterns of world economic interaction and prospective shifts in the balance 
of military power provide the backdrop to the US pivot to Asia. As a result of these 
contemporary developments, members of the Western Alliance, including EU countries in 
general, and Central and Eastern European countries in specific, need to rethink their 
fundamental approach to contemporary security challenges. One of the most pressing issues in 
this respect is how to maintain the stability of Europe’s peripheries in the Western Balkans 
once the US further scales back its presence in these areas. This article argues that besides a 
clear road to European integration, continued financial assistance, and the credible 
Europeanization of the commitment to security assistance for the countries of the region, V4 
countries have a meaningful role to play as well – a role for which they may be well 
positioned and which they clearly are required to play in a constructive and strategic division 
of labor with their partners. 
Analysis 
In line with the redoubled interest in Asian affairs it is reasonable from the American point of 
view that the US needs to keep only some troops in Europe, just enough to avoid encouraging 
Russia to become more animated towards Europe. In case Russia were to see Europe as 
abandoned it may suggest to Moscow for instance to seek to increase its leverage in the 
Balkans or in Central and Eastern Europe and to fill any real or perceived power vacuum 
there. On the other hand, NATO and the security of Europe is not a direct function of the 
physical presence of US troops on the continent. The latter stems much more from the Article 
5 commitment underlying the Alliance which keeps the US in Europe regardless of its troop 
presence. At the same time, however, both a reiterated signal of this commitment and that of 
the Europeans’ resolve to invest in their own security are needed for an effective response to 
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recent developments. Somewhat paradoxically, without the signal of European resolve even 
the signal of the transatlantic security commitment may wane in credibility over time. 
European countries are obviously unprepared and unwilling to play a military role in any 
meaningful way in the Asia-Pacific. But Europe does not need to emulate the US pivot to 
Asia to remain a partner of the US. Firstly, US officials emphasize that the pivot to Asia need 
not necessarily be understood as a military move. It is, at least in part, a reflection of the 
obvious economic trends and the shift in patterns of economic growth and trade and 
investment towards the other hemisphere. Thus, even though the EU remains the most 
important trade and investment partner for the US to this day, the traditional focus on 
transatlantic space may, at superficial glance, seem to be overwhelmed by a tsunami of 
interest in Pacific affairs.  
Having said that, the Pentagon’s setting up of the AirSea Battle Office, supervising the 
development of its joint AirSea Battle concept, relevant as it is for the moment in hypothetical 
scenarios centered on China, clearly indicates that there are military considerations as well 
behind the declaration of the turn towards Asia, connected to uncertainties of what the future 
holds by implication of China’s rise. This is also underlined by the deployment of the US 
marine contingent sent to Darwin, Australia during the Spring of 2012. Such preparation for 
future military conflict is one area where the EU cannot hope, and does not wish, to counter 
the unpleasant trends shaping its perceived importance on the world stage. Even though the 
EU as a whole is by far the second largest military spender in the world, reflecting the actual 
economic weight of Europe, the efficiency of its member countries’ defense spending is low 
and from Washington it is felt to be little contribution to current US foreign policy goals. The 
European defense market is fragmented and suffers from protectionist trends in spite of recent 
efforts by the European Commission to remedy this problem. Defense spending in the case of 
most European countries simply does not correspond to a global notion of strategic change. In 
fact, many of them are fundamentally uncomfortable with such a grand strategic approach, as 
noted in a recent paper by the European Council on Foreign Relations.2
Thus European countries need in alternative ways to prove that they are still important allies. 
The strategic rationale for this is ambivalent and contradictory: the US will decrease its 
presence in Europe, Europe needs the US in maintaining its security, but for this purpose it 
needs to improve its military capabilities and to demonstrate that it is able to defend itself, 
eventually working against the need for the US to stay in Europe. Furthermore, decreasing US 
troop presence means that the US is less well positioned to influence European security and 
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defense affairs, hence it may risk losing its leverage over European security. Thus, the US 
approach to an independent European security identity has been somewhat ambiguous 
historically – Washington would have always liked to see a larger European commitment but 
historically it has also been skeptical of such projects as they risk decreasing US influence 
over European security.3 The arising contradiction can be resolved if EU countries
consciously look to substitute the US in places that remain somewhat important to the US but 
where this may allow the US to shift some of the burden it carries to Europe, in a strategic 
transatlantic division of labor. The Western Balkans is the case in point as to where this may 
be necessary. 
The US can withdraw from the Balkans (both its ground troops and by scaling back its 
development aid) only if the EU is ready to substitute it there with determined and 
constructive leadership. The EU can hardly assume that this should be someone else’s 
problem. Clearly, Europe needs to take on greater responsibility for its security in its own 
neighborhood. 
The change in US foreign policy thinking should not have come as particularly surprising 
given how in any realistic assessment Cold-War-era geopolitical calculations are outdated. 
The Warsaw Pact long since ceased to exist, many of its members now belong in NATO, and 
there is no longer a hundred-plus-divisions-strong Soviet Army ready to move across the 
North German Plain and the Fulda Gap. The new generation of strategic thinkers in the US is 
not “Berlin-focused” and even the Cold War strategists of old have come to emphasize that 
the new challenge is Asia. US administration officials whom Europeans seem to have 
expected to be members of an old guard somehow, with a stronger sense of personal 
attachment (read: one unaffected by current and future interests) to the transatlantic bond, 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel or Secretary of State John Kerry, have proved no deniers 
of the need for said readjustment. 
The shock of the economic and financial crisis and the resulting cuts in the US defense budget 
have worked as the final catalyst in bringing about the US determination to lessen its 
engagement globally, including and especially where it may no longer be warranted as much 
as it once used to be. Europe is the safest bet in this respect. Less money, coupled with the 
effect of the new focus has resulted in less attention to Europe. Thus the question is not how 
Europe can help in Asia, but how Europe can fill the vacuum in the wake of the US presence 
on the continent. European countries must prove they have a clear strategic vision regarding 
this and as to how they will contribute to NATO after 2014 and the end of the mission in 
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Afghanistan. This will certainly need to include plans concerning ways for the Europeans to 
relieve the US in places close to Europe (or in Europe proper). Smaller regional blocks such 
as the V4 can and ought to show leadership in this strategic adjustment, with particular regard 
to the Western Balkans. 
NATO still has a role to play there, and the organization can and must remain active even if 
the US scales back its European commitment: in principle, this should only mean relying 
more on the Alliance’s European component in the future. The planned shift of emphasis from 
operational engagement to operational readiness under the NATO Forces 2020 vision should 
not be interpreted as a wild card for anyone to abandon all existing engagements. The stability 
and security of the Western Balkans will have to be maintained by the European NATO allies, 
working within the framework of the existing Berlin-Plus arrangement, perhaps under the 
aegis of the EU’s CFSP and ESDP, thus giving clearer signal of a resolve to act on Europe’s 
own. 
This is where Visegrad countries enter the scene. The involvement of the V4 in the region is 
significant and this political leverage may be real added value to the above mentioned goals of 
selective retrenchment on the part of the US and the marginally important signal of resolve on 
the part of the EU, in line with common US, European and regional interests.  
Central and Eastern European countries may be some of the best allies of the United States 
but in 2013 they are definitely not the most important ones. The pivot to Asia ought not 
inevitably translate into a pivot away from Europe but it certainly means significant change in 
the decades-long paradigmatic understanding of transatlantic arrangements. This may leave 
CEE countries in search of answers to important issues in their security policy where in the 
past seemingly much safer answers used to be found, such as is the need to maintain stability 
in their direct vicinity where US presence long functioned as a security anchor for them and 
for all of Europe. 
In fact, the US willingness to lead in dealing with security issues in and around Europe has 
already come to an end. Since the inauguration of Barack Obama the clearly indicated global 
foreign policy intention of the US is to be present but not deeply involved in all global issues. 
The intervention in Libya in 2011 serves as the perfect example in this respect: a joint Anglo-
French initiative executed with a decisive, even critically important, US contribution, 
eventually brought under the NATO framework. Here the US was content with less than 
leading from behind, making a point out of leaving key strategic decisions and the bulk of the 
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aerial bombing campaign against the Gaddafi regime to European and other allies even as it in 
many ways enabled Europeans to act in the first place. 
We cannot expect change in this respect during President Obama’s second term. The US is 
overstretched politically and economically. It is balancing on the edge of the fiscal cliff, with 
the effects of sequestration setting in, and it faces numerous global security challenges as 
several emerging competitors seem to challenge its global power and leadership, most notably 
China. It is exactly here, on the global level, that Russia by now is perhaps less important than 
China is for the United States. Due to this reason any Russian reanimation in its “extended 
near abroad”, a possible concern for the CEE states, could be of secondary importance only 
for Washington. 
Nevertheless, the US cannot altogether ignore such developments, either. This may put the V4 
in a position to keep the US interested in providing marginally relevant, or in other words 
enabling, support in protecting the region, to thus prevent Eastern Europe from becoming a
space for geopolitical contest once again.  
After 2014 and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is a risk that V4 countries will become 
even less relevant both within NATO and for the US. Their contributions to allied operations 
will remain important in sustaining the transatlantic relationship as well as their ties to the US 
but the fulfillment of their basic obligations as allied countries within NATO will perhaps 
become even more important in the future. This is problematic as, with the exception of 
Poland, the other three V4 countries are far from meeting the desired GDP-proportionate ratio 
of defense spending. The US will be interested in making sure that security free-riding in the 
alliance is no longer an option. Thus the US commitment to Europe can be maintained only if 
the Europeans invest seriously in their own defense, redressing the balance within the 
currently lopsided burden-sharing arrangement within the Alliance. Apart from NATO, the 
only security guarantor for the CEE countries may be the European Union but for all intents 
and purposes even the EU cannot be reasonably expected to be effective without working in 
unison with the broader Western alliance. Some of the same countries that do not at this point 
do what this would take within NATO ought to do more for defense if they were to offer an 
alternative security guarantee in EU colors. As to V4 countries, they must in any case
cooperate with each other just as they need be able to show to their partners a coherent 
strategic vision and real initiative in this respect. 
Preferably, the relation with Washington needs to be improved from its present state. Today 
for the CEE countries the EU’s gravitational pull may be stronger, and the position of “best 
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allies” of the US seems less enticing or rewarding to pursue. The V4 countries today are, 
however, EU insiders and in this capacity they also participate in shaping the foreign policy of 
the EU wherein lies both an opportunity and the need to act.  
The US will not completely abandon interest in Europe but in a time of financial difficulties 
its motivations for engagement are rather modest and V4 countries need to show that they 
understand the quid pro quo principles of politics if they are to continue to enjoy the kind of 
enabling protection alluded to above. The US cannot invest more in Europe’s security than 
Europe itself, and the US strives to redefine the role of NATO to just this end. “Europe whole 
and free” has always been an idealist expression of US foreign policy objectives, and it is 
clear that CEE countries’ security cannot be taken for granted all by this stated commitment 
for eternity. Simply complaining about the decreasing attention will no longer pay dividends 
in Washington. V4 countries can, however, prove their willingness to participate in a mutually 
advantageous global division of labor if they take a constructive role in managing and solving 
problems that are also defined as such by Washington but where the US reasonably expects 
more of a readiness to act on their part. 
In the last years respect for NATO has shrunk in the Western Balkans, and so has, 
simultaneously, the popularity of the US. Keeping NATO relevant in the region in 
maintaining security and stability is an important goal for the US in order for it to be able to 
leave the region without losing face. Some room for maneuver for the V4 countries stems 
from this: they need to emphasize their already significant presence in the Western Balkans 
and their role in support of the European integration of the region. The stability of the 
Western Balkans is important both for the EU and the US. The continued enlargement of the 
EU towards this region would contribute to the general foreign policy goals of the US in 
maintaining stability in the Western Balkans at the time when Washington intends to decrease 
its engagement. The above logic is valid even if the Western Balkans has also become a 
source of contention among V4 countries as Slovakia does not recognize the independence of 
Kosovo. Thus, while a clear V4 interest can be established in the region, there is also 
considerable intra-V4 coordination that needs to be done in order to clarify each country’s 
approach to the region. Furthermore, the Western Balkans also directly pertains to V4 
countries’ relations with Russia. However, despite the obvious difficulties involved in 
coordinating V4 policies via the Western Balkans, these efforts do represent an added value as 
all of them are interested in the region’s stability in general. 
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On the other hand, the US cannot leave the future development of the Balkans simply to the 
EU and the countries of the region. The US is present in the Western Balkans since the 1990s 
and the region for long used to be the symbol for Washington that Europeans are not capable 
of solving their own problems. The uneven enthusiasm of EU countries to be engaged there 
and the fatigue of even the larger project of European integration call for caution. EU 
accession may be the final destination on the road for the countries of the Western Balkans, 
but for this to be a viable perspective, a commitment to provide continued assistance is going 
to be necessary. Washington therefore still feels it has a responsibility in maintaining stability 
in case the EU cannot substitute it in providing for this. From Washington’s vantage point an
ideal process would be EU-led and US-supported. However, EU-US cooperation regarding 
the Balkans is less robust than in other areas. A fundamental source of divergence is that 
whereas the US prefers a clear map of integration, the EU today is more comfortable with 
ambiguity in this respect. The rhetoric as to the foremost foreign policy goal of the EU 
remains to expand its sphere of security, stability and prosperity in its neighborhood – what 
exact measures this eventually corresponds to remains an open question. This is where V4 
interests are perhaps more aligned with those of the US than the EU: a clear road to 
integration with appropriate conditions serves regional stability in the wider CEE region as 
well. 
Thus, the ambivalent approach of the EU may need to be revisited soon. As to why, it may 
suffice to point out prominent US voices’ calls for the withdrawal of all US ground troops and 
development aid from the Western Balkans. The transfer of responsibility of peacekeeping 
from NATO, and thus per consequence the US, to the EU is already in progress. There is no 
denying the fact that the region is more important for the EU and that in a geopolitical and 
strategic sense US goals are rather marginal there. This is also evidenced by the fact that the 
Obama administration hardly expressed clear strategic statements on the Western Balkans. 
During the last years there have been several high level visits to the region on the part of the 
administration which, however, focused mostly on specific pragmatic issues rather than on the 
region as a whole, corresponding to the above indicated lack of interest in strategic leadership 
by the US. Only some voices have remained in Washington that refer to the US goal of 
containing growing Russian influence in the region. Obama’s policy is in fact the direct 
continuation of the Bush administration’s policy and its goal of stabilizing the region by 
supporting its European integration.  
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Despite the EU’s internal problems and doubts, the EU is still popular in the Western Balkans, 
and this should give the EU decent prospects in substituting for the US leverage its own. Due 
to the diminishing US presence in the Western Balkans it is a strategic imperative for both the 
EU and the US that the EU fill the vacuum or else it may be filled by Russia and possibly,
although less so, by China. Economically, the EU is already lagging behind as Russia has 
consolidated its positions in various markets of the Western Balkans. Thus, it is perhaps time 
to make up for this in the realm of security, which of course cannot entirely be separated from 
the realm of economy. In the midst of the financial crisis the level of financial support to the 
Western Balkan countries cannot match earlier amounts. Consequently, a permanent shift 
from development aid to more viable and effective technical assistance is needed that under 
the circumstances would allow for sufficient concentration of resources and the achievement 
of maximal effect.  
Focusing on the Western Balkans is not a new idea for the Visegrad countries. The region is 
formally on the top of the common agenda since 2009, and V4 countries coordinate their 
positions before EU meetings regarding it. In October 2012, the foreign ministers of the V4 
met in a V4+Balkans format and agreed to set up the Balkan Expert Network which will assist 
the European integration and the democratic transition of the countries of the region. The EU 
is supportive of this initiative, as evidenced by the fact that Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement, was present at the meeting. The EU as a whole is a respected mediator of the 
conflicts in the Western Balkans, and the V4 can provide leadership in utilizing this political 
capital in furtherance of common objectives.
Visegrad countries need to actively promote this role on the stage of EU and world politics, as 
they have recent and firsthand experience with parallel processes of European integration and 
democratic transition. The transfer of know-how remains added value for the stability and the 
progress of the Western Balkans at the various stages of their transitions. The Visegrad 
countries may consider engaging and partnering with other countries with similar experiences 
in some kind of V4+ format inviting Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia (and possibly non-
NATO-member Austria). The aim of this idea is the formation of a significant informal group 
within NATO with a notion of clear new imperatives. This group could also reach out towards 
the Black Sea region which is considered strategically more important to the US. 
There are several instances of how V4 countries can support the otherwise vague American 
goals in the Western Balkans. NATO expansion towards the Western Balkan countries slowed 
down, but the accession of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia remains 
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important for Washington. The process is supported by the V4 countries. A good example is 
that the Hungarian Embassy to Podgorica also functioned as official NATO contact point up 
till 2010. Poland is the largest provider of ground forces in the region from within the V4 and 
thus has considerable clout over the transformation process of KFOR and the management of 
the situation in the wake of the prospective withdrawal of US forces. Slovakia, for its part, has 
several top diplomats who have extensive experience working in or with the region.  
Today the Balkans is becoming more a concern for CFSP than that of NATO. In case the V4
countries want to influence and shape the common foreign policy of the EU, which is 
obviously a goal especially in the case of Poland, and an interest especially in the case of 
Hungary, V4 countries together need to develop a clear position on the Western Balkans. On 
the other hand, NATO also needs to remain relevant there, which is the goal of the US even as 
it seeks to sacrifice marginally less for this purpose. From this stems that NATO’s open door 
policy needs to be kept alive, especially considering the fact that NATO enlargement is only 
imaginable towards the Balkans now, in contrast to the perceived potential of the Eastern 
Partnership of the EU in terms of future EU enlargement. 
In short: whereas the centre of gravity in European politics may be as hard to locate as ever, 
with Brussels as well as London, Paris and Berlin all playing a role in this respect, and 
although the European Union itself has expressed interest in becoming an actor on the world 
stage, the EU as well as V4 countries need a pivot to the Western Balkans first of all if they 
are to succeed in projecting security, stability and prosperity into their immediate 
neighborhood.  
Conclusion: Recommendations 
x Continue focusing on the Western Balkans. The Eastern Partnership countries are also
important but the payoffs are more visible in the case of the former.
x Focus on issues where marginal contributions can be made by substituting US efforts.
x Demonstrate credible leadership capacity as a regional bloc.
x Intensify consultations for this purpose within the framework of the V4+Balkans
format at the same time as the overarching EU and NATO framework of the initiative
is also emphasized.
x The Visegrad Battle Group has to be a reflection of truly found interest in contributing
to the future stability of the neighborhood in ways that may be necessary as other
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countries may become less forthcoming in offering assistance in the security 
dimension.  
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